"Core-Periphery" in the European Union – An Economic Perspective by Kersan-Škabić, Ines
146|https://doi.org/10.3311/PPso.13979Creative Commons Attribution b
Periodica Polytechnica Social and Management Sciences, 28(2), pp. 146–154, 2020  
Cite this article as: Kersan-Škabić, I. (2020) ""Core-Periphery" in the European Union – An Economic Perspective", Periodica Polytechnica Social and 
Management Sciences, 28(2), pp. 146–154. https://doi.org/10.3311/PPso.13979
"Core-Periphery" in the European Union – 
An Economic Perspective
Ines Kersan-Škabić1*
1 Faculty of Economics and Tourism “Dr. Mijo Mirković”, Juraj Dobrila University of Pula, Ul. Petra Preradovićeva 1/1, 52100, 
Pula, Croatia
* Corresponding author, e-mail: ikersan@unipu.hr
Received: 04 March 2019, Accepted: 12 November 2019, Published online: 15 April 2020
Abstract
The heterogeneity of economic performances in the EU member states is one of the main reasons for the existence of a “core-periphery” 
relationship. The goal of this research is to examine various economic indicators to reveal possible divisions between the EU members. 
This issue emphasized the contribution of rich “core” countries to the imbalances in poorer “peripheral” EU members. By applying cluster 
methodology and considering the most recent data, two groups of countries were identified, the first comprising 11 countries that form 
the “centre” or the “core”, and the rest of the EU forming the “periphery”. Considering differences between these countries is necessary 
and justified for discussions about the future development of the EU that will involve differences between member states.
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1 Introduction
The European Commission (2017) has presented a White 
Paper on the future of Europe which outlines five dif-
ferent scenarios about the possible ways of cooperation 
between member states. Some of these scenarios allow for 
EU membership that is not of the same intensity for all 
members: some of the members could create a stronger 
union, and some of them could participate only in trade 
and investment issues of the possibility of an EU of this 
kind has raised the question of the “core-periphery model”. 
Evidence of such a model also appeared during and after 
the global financial crisis (from 2008 onwards), but with 
a possible and uncertain new division in the EU, it will 
become even more obvious.
The concept of “core-periphery” can be analysed from 
various different perspectives: historical, economic, geo-
graphical (Vanolo, 2010) and political. The historical 
approach differentiates the “original six” (countries that 
signed the Paris and Rome treaties in 1951 and 1957 respec-
tively) that established the first integrations in Europe1 and 
the enlargements of such integration completed by 1995 
(the “core” countries or EU-15) from the countries that 
1 European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and European 
Economic Community (EEC).
joined the EU in the 2000s (new member states). From the 
economic point of view, the countries can be categorised 
as core or periphery according to their economic achieve-
ments (development, trade imbalances, fiscal indicators, 
etc.). In addition, there is Eurozone division into core and 
periphery states, where the periphery can be both inner 
(Eurozone member states - South EU) and outer (non-Eu-
rozone member states, but EU members). The same can 
be applied to the core which can also be inner and outer 
(Eurozone members and non-Eurozone core members). 
Bartlett and Prica (2016) additionally define super-periph-
ery – countries of the Western Balkans (non-EU members). 
The political aspect includes the democracy gap between 
periphery and core, where new member states are lagging 
behind due to a long period of having one-party political 
systems, followed by a process of transition (at the begin-
ning of the 1990s) with the gradual establishment of democ-
racy and new institutions. Some of the new member states 
have reduced, formally legal, low-performing democracies 
with poor governance and non-sustainable social progress. 
Accordingly, the expectation that the collapse of commu-
nism and the victory of Western liberalism would make for 
swift convergence between the Eastern and Western parts 
of Europe has turned out to be an illusion.
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The goal of this paper is to analyse whether the divi-
sion between “core-and-periphery” still exists in the EU, 
10 years after the global financial crisis and in the context 
of a debate about the future of the EU. The analysis will 
cover all the 28 EU member states and groups of “core” 
and “periphery” areas will be based on  various eco-
nomic indicators such as: GDP p.c., current account (im)
balances, fiscal indicators (budget deficit and public debt 
share in GDP) and the various rates of migration. The last 
variable seems to be very important due to the fact that 
participation in the Single Market opens the borders for 
migration of people between EU member states. The core 
countries, being more developed, are attractive destina-
tions for the immigration of the working population from 
periphery countries that face a higher level of unemploy-
ment and lower wages. A country can thus be considered 
to belong to the periphery if it has negative migration bal-
ance (emigration is higher than immigration). A cluster 
analysis will be carried out for all the variables with the 
aim of determining which of these two groups a particular 
country belongs to. The novel aspect of this paper is that it 
aims to identify the different groups of EU member states 
considering different variables, as well as comparing the 
results of two clustering approaches.
2 Literature review
The easiest and first way of differentiating core from 
periphery countries is according to their geographical 
position, but today the concept of core-periphery has 
expanded to include different aspects and characteristics. 
In economics, a commonly used indicator is GDP per cap-
ita to divide countries into a group of highly developed 
(with above-average GDP per capita) EU members and 
other EU member states (with below-average GDP per 
capita). For the purpose of the EU cohesion policy, the 
NUTS2 regions are divided into three groups of regions: 
regions with GDP per capita below 75 % of EU28’s GDP 
per capita, regions with GDP per capita in the range from 
75-90 % of EU28’s GDP per capita and regions with a GDP 
per capita higher than 90 % of the EU28’s GDP per capita.
Core-periphery models also appear within national 
economies and describe the concentration of activities in 
urban areas vs. peripheral areas (regions), i.e. concentra-
tion-dispersion forces. 
New Economic Geography (NEG) is the analytical 
framework established by Krugman in the early 1990s 
to explain the formation of various types of economic 
agglomerations in geographical space. Krugman (1991) 
uses a general equilibrium model and explains what, 
how and when the concentration of activities is affected 
and why there is a difference in spatial development. 
His explanations are applicable both to the agglomera-
tion of activities at the urban and regional level, and at 
the country level (North-South division). This concept of 
a two-region core-periphery model has become the basis 
of the NEG that seeks to integrate urban, regional and 
international economics in a single theoretical framework 
and, more generally, to remedy the omission of space from 
mainstream economics.
Core-periphery models will appear where the core is 
developed (with the domination of industry) and the periph-
ery is underdeveloped (where the agricultural sector is 
dominant). This very simple explanation should nowadays 
be complemented with more variables when attempting to 
define core and periphery. This concept can be applied to 
explain not only the concentration/dispersion of activities 
in one particular country, but also at the EU level to explain 
the similarities and differences between EU member states. 
Some authors have proposed a relationship whereby the 
core developed EU centre contributes to the appearance 
and deepening of the imbalances in South and South-East 
Europe (Lapavitsas et al., 2010). Bartlett (2014) explains 
the core-periphery model in the EU in terms of the depen-
dency between highly developed core countries and the 
countries of South-East Europe. He points out that the 
import demand and credit activities in South European 
countries contributed to current account surpluses in 
“core” countries that were faced with under-consump-
tion and were threatened by stagnation. He suggests a 
better way out of the current period through coordinated 
fiscal expansion to stimulate domestic and Europe-wide 
demand. The developed EU member states should play a 
role in solving the problems of South-European countries 
because they influence their ability to sustain development 
perspectives. Nikolovska and Mamucevska (2015) con-
firm the thesis that the core countries with current account 
surpluses became richer thanks to their export to and 
investment in the EU periphery. Armingeon and Baccaro 
(2012) also found that the German current account surplus 
is equal to the deficit of Greece, Spain, Portugal and taly 
together, indicating that Germany and other “core” coun-
tries developed their economies thanks to their exports to 
South-European countries. The authors also found that 
the internal devaluation policy is inadequate in the EU 
peripheral countries. Steinberg and de Cienfuegos (2012) 
indicate the political and economic risks associated with 
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the German strategy to solve the Eurozone’s debt cri-
sis. They warn that Germany is leading the reform of the 
Eurozone’s governance, but it is doing so based on an 
incomplete diagnosis of the crisis, believing that fiscal 
austerity will be enough to save the euro. They argue that 
the German strategy of “authoritarian austerity” is hin-
dering economic growth in Europe. The division between 
Eurozone members with current account (CA) sur-
pluses and Eurozone members with CA deficits is called 
“Eurozone CA core-periphery dualism” and it is a product 
of both the long-run sustainability of peripheral EU mem-
ber states’ finances and the ineffectiveness of centralised 
interventions within the euro area.
The asymmetry of power between core and periphery 
in EU has made it very difficult for the peripheral states to 
obtain sufficient political capacity to secure an alternative 
policy mix. Caraveli (2012) analysed a set of macroeconomic 
variables across EU regions, and found that although the 
core-periphery is still persistent, EU regional policy has had 
a positive impact on the reduction of regional inequalities.
Sobják (2013) pointed out the increasing differences 
even between Central and Eastern European countries (EU 
member states) which formed a more homogeneous group 
before the crisis, and discussed the divide between EU 
member states in the post-crisis period. The crisis has also 
affected the economic geography of the EU because some 
new member states have achieved better performance than 
some of the Southern members of the EU15 and this could 
be a way of improving their position in the EU.
Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1993) raised concerns about 
a core–periphery divide of the EU even in the period of 
pre-EMU. They estimated the degree of business cycle syn-
chronisation, and argued that there is a core of EU states 
(Germany, France, Belgium, Netherlands, and Denmark) 
where supply shocks are highly correlated, and a periph-
ery (Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Spain, and the UK) 
where synchronisation is significantly lower. Campos and 
Macchiarelli (2016) used the same methodology and found 
that the core–periphery pattern has weakened over the last 
25 years. Moreover, Pentecôte and Huchet-Bourdon (2012) 
extended the Bayomi and Eichengreen (1993) study. They 
applied Euclidean distance to the core, and found that 
shock asymmetry mostly arose from the production or the 
demand side. They analysed the period from 1996 to 2008 
in 21 countries and found evidence of a gradual move to the 
symmetric core while new EMU Member States remained 
at the very periphery. De Santis and Cesaroni (2016) found 
that financial integration played a role in explaining CA 
dynamics in the EU countries and had a negative impact 
on the Eurozone periphery (in the post-Euro period). 
Botta (2012) warns of conflicting interests in the Eurozone, 
emphasizing that diverging trends have arisen in the 
post-crisis period in the Eurozone periphery and the con-
flicting claims of euro countries may represent decisive 
obstacles to the reform of the Eurozone into a complete 
federal entity. “However, they may prove to be self-defeat-
ing in the long run should financial turbulences seriously 
deepen in the large peripheral countries” (Botta, 2012:p.1).
Kottaridi (2005) studied the implications of foreign 
direct investments for the core-periphery division in the 
EU. She found a differentiation between these groups of 
countries where FDI and human capital had a significant 
role in the core countries, while in peripheral areas, in 
most cases, these variables turned out to be incapable of 
boosting growth. The author explained these results with 
reference to the host characteristics of the regions: the 
technology-based attractiveness of the core vs. a duality 
of market and the cost advantages of the periphery.
Neck and Blueschke (2014) analysed the asymmetry in the 
EU (Eurozone) regarding the level of public debt. The core 
countries have lower initial public debt while the periphery 
countries have higher levels of initial public debt. They con-
cluded that the ‘‘periphery’’ may experience a “haircut” due 
to the high level of its sovereign debt, but this kind of “hair-
cut” as modelled in their study is disadvantageous for both 
the ‘‘core’’ and the ‘‘periphery’’ of the monetary union.
Wortmann and Stahl (2016) applied different clus-
ter algorithms to a set of Macroeconomic Imbalance 
Procedure indicators and found that both the core Eurozone 
countries and the United Kingdom, Denmark, and Sweden 
are suited to having a common currency, while the other 
group of countries (Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and 
Spain plus Cyprus and Croatia) on the southern periphery, 
as well as most of the countries of the eastern enlargement, 
are found to form very distinct clusters in terms of com-
petitiveness, indebtedness, and economic performance.
Lehwald (2013) found that the main macroeconomic 
variables move in the same direction for the core Eurozone 
countries from the pre-euro period to the euro period, 
while they decrease for the most peripheral economies. 
There is an evidence of increases in business cycle syn-
chronization for the core and a decline for the periph-
ery. The introduction of the euro has fostered imbalances 
between core and peripheral Eurozone countries.
There is even a core-periphery tendency in science 
and innovation policy, where the periphery countries 
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achieved some level of convergence with the core in the 
pre-crisis period, but this model can be recognized only 
on the practical level of governance and policy-making 
(Lažnjak and Švarc, 2016).
Thomas (2013) discusses the core-periphery model in 
the context of regional policy and by comparing some eco-
nomic indicators draws conclusions about the concentra-
tion of industrial activities in core countries of the EU.
Pascariu and Ţigănaşu (2017) point to the existence 
of the core-periphery division in the EU due to enlarge-
ment and implement a composite index of peripherality 
to find out the determinants of convergence and growth 
in Central and Eastern Europe and to assess the effective-
ness of regional policy in the EU. They discuss Eastern and 
Southern peripherality and distinguish two types of periph-
erality: economic and spatial. They propose developing an 
integrated approach reflecting the complexity of the eco-
nomic and spatial processes which affect the European 
economy and propose a composite index. The index 
of economic peripherality includes GVA (Gross value 
added) per employee, trade openness (export and import 
share in GDP), and inward FDI stocks in GDP. They con-
cluded that “free trade/transactions on the common market 
may emphasize the gaps through processes of industrial 
agglomeration, at least at regional and intra-national lev-
els; FDI produces positive effects on competitiveness, but 
is more volatile during crises (bearing the risk of amplify-
ing asymmetric shocks) and its effects on GVA are lower 
than on local capital…” (Pascariu and Ţigănaşu, 2017:p.71).
Caraveli (2017), provides graphical presentations of the 
main trends in Central and Eastern Europe and in South 
Europe and underlines the necessity of including labour 
productivity and FDI inflows as indicators to make a dis-
tinction between Southern peripherality and Central and 
Eastern European peripherality. She describes the core- 
periphery model in Europe thus: “the EU core still cov-
ers the area between London, Paris, Milan, Munich and 
Hamburg. It has been subject to transformations over the 
years: 
• around the 1990s, new centres appeared in Southern 
Europe, forming a ‘southern development zone’ 
extending from North-Eastern Spain to Northern 
Italy; 
• new centres have emerged in the past 10 years in cap-
itals such as Warsaw, Prague, Bratislava, Budapest 
and Bucharest” (Caraveli, 2017:p.18).
The core-periphery pattern in Europe exists and 
expresses a fragile equilibrium which reflects the dynam-
ics of change. In addition, she points out that “the core-pe-
riphery gap remains quite strong in terms of compet-
itiveness and productivity levels, weakening the EU’s 
competitive position globally vis-à -vis other large econ-
omies…”(Caraveli, 2017:p.18).
Da Silva (2017) also researched the Central- Eastern 
peripherality vs. Southwestern peripherality in the EU. 
Besides the previously mentioned indicators she intro-
duced the export structure in the analysis of conver-
gence and found out that Eastern European countries have 
shown greater capabilities of catching-up (until 2008) 
and of stimulating export-led growth. That is related to 
a strong manufacturing sector and compatible with the 
increase of technology readiness and skill-intensive activ-
ities. Nevertheless, after the crisis both groups of coun-
tries have been unable to catch up with the EU core. 
Caporale et al. (2014) focused their research on the 
cases of Romania and Bulgaria and their catching up with 
the rest of the EU. Specifically they wanted to find out 
whether there is a shift towards intra-industry trade lead-
ing to economic convergence and technological catch-up. 
They found that the “results indicate that intra-industry trade 
has indeed increased, but it is of the vertical rather than hori-
zontal type, resulting in complementary rather than compet-
itive production patterns” (Caporale et al., 2014:p.1). 
3 Research
3.1 Data and methodology
Based on the literature reviewed above, it is clear that coun-
tries can be compared and divided into the “core” and “periph-
ery” in terms of various variables: GDP p.c., public debt (% 
of GDP), trade surplus/deficit (Caraveli, 2017); investment 
in R&D, FDI (Kottaridi, 2005); macroeconomic imbalance 
procedure (MIP) indicators (Wortmann and Stahl, 2016), 
CA (Armingeon and Baccaro, 2012) and fiscal variables 
(Neck and Blueschke, 2014).
We decided to include the following variables in our 
analysis: GDP per capita in euro (constant prices), GDP 
growth rate (%), public debt (% in GDP), budget deficit (% 
in GDP), CA surplus/deficit (% in GDP), trade openness 
(export of goods and services/GDP or import of goods and 
services/GDP), trade surplus/deficit (% in GDP), intra-ex-
port and intra-import (in % of total export or import), migra-
tion flows (crude rate of migration on 1,000 inhabitants), 
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inward FDI (% in GDP) chosen MIP variables: interna-
tional investment position (IIP)2, unit labour costs (ULC, 
the ratio of labour costs to labour productivity), unemploy-
ment rates (%). The data are from the Eurostat database 
and refer to 2017, or the three-year-period average (for MIP 
indicators). The analysis is made applying Stata 14.
To connect responses given by similar countries, we 
conducted a cluster analysis (Hair et al., 2010). 
Multivariate cluster analysis is one of the methods 
which group objects into small homogeneous groups 
(clusters) which are heterogeneous with each other. At the 
beginning of clustering it is important to decide whether 
we know in advance how many clusters should be gener-
ated by the analysis or whether we will accept the final 
number of clusters that will be produced by cluster analy-
sis. By applying different clustering algorithms, different 
results on the same data can be obtained. Various cluster-
ing methods can be applied: linkage methods (single link-
age method, complete linkage method, average linkage 
method), Ward’s method, and the centroid method.  They 
differ regarding the method of calculating the distance 
between clusters. The idea is to create groups that are very 
homogeneous. The most common approaches are either 
hierarchical or non-hierarchical. The first - hierarchical 
clustering - is depicted by a tree or dendrogram. There 
are two approaches to hierarchical clustering: we can go 
“from the bottom up”, grouping small clusters into larger 
ones, or “from the top down”, splitting big clusters into 
small ones. These are called agglomerative and divisive 
clustering, respectively. The basic algorithm is very sim-
ple: start with each point in a cluster of its own until there 
is only one cluster; find the closest pair of clusters, merge 
them, then return to the tree of cluster-mergers. 
We applied two methods:
• a hierarchical cluster analysis (Ward’s methodology) 
and
• k-means methodology.
Ward suggested a general agglomerative hierarchical 
procedure, where the criterion for choosing the pair of 
clusters to merge at each step is based on the optimal value 
of an objective function. Ward’s method starts with n clus-
ters, each containing a single object. These n clusters are 
combined to make one cluster containing all objects. 
2 The difference between an economy’s external financial assets and 
liabilities is the economy’s net IIP, which may be positive or negative. 
The MIP scoreboard indicator is the net international investment posi-
tion expressed in percent of GDP.
At each step, the process forms a new cluster that mini-
mizes variance, measured by an index called E (the sum of 
squares index) Ward’s minimum variance criterion minimi-
zes the total within-cluster variance. To implement this met-
hod, at each step it is necessary to find the pair of clusters 
that leads to the minimum increase in total within-cluster 
variance after merging. This increase is a weighted squa-
red distance between cluster centers. The initial distance 
between individual objects must be (proportional to) squa-
red Euclidean distance (L2). We used Euclidean metric but 
were confronted with a dilemma as to whether to apply the 
complete linkage method or Ward’s method. The complete 
linkage method calculates the differences between the two 
most distant units, whereas Ward’s method computes the 
sum of the squared distances within the clusters. It aggre-
gates clusters with the minimum increase in the overall sum 
of squares. All variables were standardized (z-scores) before 
clustering because of the different scales used. The number 
of clusters should not be known in advance, as the appropri-
ate number will be found through the analysis. This is the 
main benefit of using this method. The idea is to find groups 
of units that share the same characteristics (very small dif-
ferences among units in a group) and significant differences 
(variation) between the clusters (Stata, 2019).
The second method is k-means with the predefined two 
clusters. K-means is a prototype-based, partitional cluster-
ing technique, because it gives only a single set of clus-
ters, with no particular organization or structure within. 
It attempts to find a user-specified number of clusters (K), 
which are represented by their centroids. K-means defines a 
prototype in terms of a centroid, which is usually the mean 
of a group of points, and is typically applied to objects in 
a continuous n-dimensional space. However it could easily 
be the case that some clusters could, themselves, be closely 
related to other clusters, and more distantly related to oth-
ers. In centroid-based clustering, clusters are represented 
by a central vector, which may not necessarily be a mem-
ber of the data set. When the number of clusters is fixed to 
k, k-means clustering gives a formal definition as an opti-
mization problem: find the k cluster centers and assign the 
objects to the nearest cluster center, such that the squared 
distances from the cluster are minimized (Stata, 2019).
3.2 Results
On the basis of the variables detailed above and applying 
the Ward’s method several dendrograms were generated. 
The first dendrogram shows the grouping of EU members 
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by only one variable: GDP per capita. A hierarchical forma-
tion of clusters is present, in which comprises two groups 
of countries. The first group includes Belgium, Germany, 
Finland, Austria, France, UK, Denmark, The Netherlands, 
Sweden, Ireland and Luxembourg and the second group 
includes Bulgaria, Romania, Croatia, Latvia, Hungary, 
Poland, Lithuania, Czech Republic, Greece, Portugal, 
Estonia, Slovakia, Malta, Slovenia, Spain, Cyprus and 
Italy. The first group represents the richest part of the EU, 
the “core”, while the second group of countries have a sig-
nificantly lower level of GDP per capita. The second group 
of countries includes all of the new EU member states, as 
well as Spain, Greece, Portugal and Italy from the EU-15 
(see in Fig. 1)3.
Fig. 2 shows the clustering of EU member states 
according to Macroeconomic Imbalance Indicators. This 
clustering drew on several indicators: current account 
deficit, net international investment position, unit labour 
costs, public debt, unemployment rates, youth unemploy-
ment rates. In Fig. 2 it is worth noting that after hierar-
chical grouping, three clusters were evident. the first of 
which is composed of Belgium, Denmark, Luxembourg, 
Germany, Malta, The Netherlands; the third comprising 
only Ireland, Spain, Cyprus, Portugal and Greece while 
the second cluster contains the rest of the states of the EU. 
According to the MIP indicators selected cluster 3 consists 
of the so-called PIGS or GIPS countries that were most 
affected by the consequences of the global economic cri-
sis and which were compelled to request financial aid from 
the International Monetary Fund and the EU. In the final 
stage, clusters 1 and 2 form one cluster and cluster 3 forms 
the second group.
In Fig. 3, if Malta is excluded, the EU members form 
two clusters based on migration characteristics. The first 
cluster consists of Belgium, Ireland, The Netherlands, 
Austria, Germany, Denmark, Estonia, Spain, Cyprus, 
Sweden and Luxembourg while the second cluster is made 
up of the rest of the EU states.
3 The numbers in the horizontal axis of the figures represents the coun-
tries which were the subject of this study:
1 = Belgium; 2 = Bulgaria; 3 = Czech Republic; 4 = Denmark; 
5 = Germany; 6 = Estonia; 7 = Ireland; 8 = Greece; 9 = Spain; 
10 = France; 11 = Croatia; 12 = Italy; 13 = Cyprus; 14 = Latvia; 
15 = Lithuania; 16 = Luxembourg; 17 = Hungary; 18 = Malta; 
19 = Netherlands; 20 = Austria; 21 = Poland; 22 = Portugal; 
23 = Romania; 24 = Slovenia; 25 = Slovakia; 26 = Finland; 
27 = Sweden; 28 = United Kingdom
L2 squared= Euclidean distance
It is worth noting how to determine which of these 
two groups a particular country belongs to. Italy, Finland 
and France belong to the second group of countries with 
respect to migration (which includes the new EU member 
states, Portugal and Greece). The reason is that for these 
countries the crude rate of migration per 1,000 inhabitants 
is negative (Italy -7.7) or has positive, but very small val-
ues (i.e. France 1; Finland 0.7)4. Thus these countries may 
be experiencing negative natural population growth rates 
which do not solely stem from emigration. This is the dif-
ference between these countries and the new EU member 
states which are witnessing both negative trends: higher 
levels of emigration compared to immigration (a tendency 
which EU membership contributed to) as well as negative 
natural population growth (see in Fig. 4). 
Based on public debt data, the EU can be divided into 
two clusters. The following countries belong to the first 
grouping: Belgium, Spain, France, Cyprus, UK, Italy, 
Portugal and Greece. These countries have a high level of 
public debt while other countries form the second cluster. 
In the first group, the UK has the lowest level of public 
debt (87.4 % of GDP), while Greece faced the highest level 
4 This indicator is equal to the difference between the crude rate of 
increase and the crude rate of natural increase (that is, net migration is 
considered as the part of population change not attributable to births 
and deaths).
Fig. 1 Dendrogram of EU 28 based on GDP per capita
Fig. 2 Dendrogram of EU 28 based on MIP indicators
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(176 % of GDP). In the second group, Estonia has the low-
est rate of public debt-to-GDP (just 8.7 %) while Austria 
has the highest level (78 % of GDP). 
According to Fig. 5, which covers all the above data, 
a clear distinction is evident between two clusters of EU 
member states. The first grouping comprises Belgium, 
Germany, Slovakia, The Netherlands, France, Sweden, 
Denmark, Malta, Finland, Ireland and Lithuania while the 
rest of the EU belong to the second cluster. The interest-
ing point here is that three new EU member states belong 
to cluster one.
We also applied the k-means method by defining the 
two clusters and including all the variables mentioned 
above. According to this method, the following eleven 
countries belong to the first cluster: Belgium, Denmark, 
Germany, Finland, France, Ireland, Luxembourg, 
Netherlands, Austria, Sweden, and the UK. The rest of 
the EU forms the second cluster.
3.3 Discussion
The analysis produced several common findings. Even 
the new EU member states have made progress through 
higher growth rates than the EU-15, although convergence 
is still far away and below the expected level. The results 
of the analysis suggest that the periphery of the EU does 
not only include the new EU member states, but also some 
southern members of the EU-15. The weakness of these 
latter countries emerged during and after the global eco-
nomic crisis when, with the deterioration in the exter-
nal market, the flaws in their internal economic policies 
resulted in increased indebtedness, high unemployment 
rates, emigration and stagnation. The problems revolved 
around how to change the patterns of economic policies 
that were based on huge consumption and import. It is 
necessary to consider the structure of the economy (of 
production, resources, export and import) of each country 
when proposing the measures/policies they should imple-
ment to solve the imbalances they faced. There is no copy-
paste model and no unique, clear-cut solution. If they are 
to be satisfied with their membership of the EU, it is highly 
likely that some countries will not wish to participate in 
the deepening of the EU if they do not see the benefits for 
their economies and if they predict that it will lead to fur-
ther risks and uncertainties. The discussion about the sce-
narios of the future of the EU will reveal both the interests 
of particular countries and of the political groups in the 
EU Parliament and will indicate the direction in which the 
EU should be built in the future. 
4 Conclusion
The analysis in this paper appears to confirm that a 
core-periphery problem exists in the EU. Based on vari-
ous economic indicators, the results show that the core 
is formed by Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Finland, 
France, Ireland, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Austria, 
Sweden, and UK5. The periphery consists of Bulgaria, 
Czech Republic, Estonia, Greece, Spain, Croatia, Cyprus, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Malta, Poland, Portugal, 
5 Even though Brexit is scheduled for the end of March 2019 (with two 
delays), the United Kingdom was here considered as an EU member to 
show that according to its economic characteristics, it belongs to the EU 
core (EU center).
Fig. 3 Dendrogram of the EU28 based on migration flows
Fig. 4 Dendrogram of the EU28 based on public debt and budget deficit
Fig. 5 Dendrogram of the EU28 based on all variables
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Romania, Slovenia and Slovakia. These findings support 
the thesis of heterogeneity in the EU, which implies differ-
ent interests, different needs and expectations across the 
members of the EU common market, of the Euro area and 
of the EU institutions. The core countries (except the UK 
due to Brexit) can consider further deepening of the EU 
if they are able to reach a consensus between the political 
parties in their countries and if the federal idea of integra-
tion overcomes the right wing political orientation which 
currently emphasizes higher protection of national inter-
ests and which has a growing power.
The periphery countries also, unquestionably, benefit 
from participation in the EU single market and from the 
EU policies (e.g. the cohesion policy through European 
Structural and Investment Funds or the agricultural pol-
icy), but due to their characteristics it would be very 
ambitious if they wanted to see the EU development in 
the same direction and to the same extent as in the EU 
core. It is necessary to consider their characteristics, eco-
nomic development path, economic structure and their 
specific features when preparing for the EU of the future. 
They belong to the EU and want to be a part of it, but they 
also want to achieve better economic performance and 
wellbeing for their population. The needs, ideas and vision 
of the core and the periphery countries will probably not 
be the same, but they will move in the same direction, 
because they recognize the benefits of the EU member-
ship. Given this heterogeneity, it is all the more important 
to reach agreement over the way that the EU will function 
in future and reach acceptable compromises on important 
and divisive issues such as migration and the EU budget 
after 2020 in order ensure the continued and beneficial 
coexistence of all EU members.
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